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DEAD MEN TELL NO TALES: ARKANSAS’S 





[A] single death is a tragedy, a million deaths are a 
statistic.1 
I.  AT DEATH’S DOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 
It is doubtful that Hulon Rupert Austin woke up on the day 
of March 7, 1986 and expected it to be his last.2  March 7 was a 
typical day—a workday—that started with a simple drive to a job 
site with his co-worker.3  A day that began so unremarkably ended 
with his co-worker looking up from where he was working to see 
“Austin lying on the ground.”4   
Following Austin’s death, the local coroner from Cleveland 
County, Arkansas, arrived at the scene.5  According to the 
coroner’s notes on the death certificate, his death was attributable 
 
        *J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022.  Managing Editor of the 
Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022.  The author extends four thank yous to the people that 
made this comment possible.  First, the author thanks her faculty advisor, Professor Steve 
Clowney, University of Arkansas School of Law, her Note and Comment Editor, Brady 
Brown, J.D. 2021, her Articles Editor, Sarah Smith, J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas 
School of Law, 2022, and the entire 2021-2022 class of Staff Editors.  Without their patience, 
knowledge, and humor, this comment would still be nonsensical doodles on a page.  Second, 
the author thanks Josie Bates.  Her unwavering love and support made even the most difficult 
parts of the writing process feel like magic.  Third, and most importantly, the author thanks 
her parents, Mike Moore and Susan Moore, and her older brother, Derek Moore.  They have 
spent their entire lives cheering the author on; in turn, she dedicates this comment to them. 
1. JOHN TIRMAN, THE DEATHS OF OTHERS: THE FATE OF CIVILIANS IN AMERICA’S 
WARS 316 (Dave McBride ed., 2011) (quoting Joseph Stalin).  
2. See Austin v. Highway 15 Water Users Ass’n, 30 Ark. App. 60, 61, 782 S.W.2d 585, 
586 (1990). 
3. See id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
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to myocardial infarction6—the medical terminology for a heart 
attack.7  Although the term used by the coroner seems indicative 
of medical training, that could not be further from the reality that 
unfolded for Austin’s family.8  In the wake of his death, Austin’s 
widow attempted to file a claim based on his death at work; 
however, the Workers’ Compensation Commission “concluded 
that there was insufficient credible evidence proving the decedent 
suffered a compensable injury.”9  While a legal battle regarding 
the compensability of the injury itself seems conventional, the 
real issue within this case has nothing to do with the type of injury 
at all—in fact, that argument is an impossible feat considering 
that the coroner “admitted that he merely guessed” as to how 
Austin died.10  In reality, the coroner had “no medical school 
training, and had [only taken] an emergency medical technician 
course.”11  Even worse, the coroner did not even attempt an 
educated guess—instead, he chose “not [to] examine [Austin]’s 
medical records, or talk with his treating physician or his wife 
prior to making his determination as to the cause of death.”12 
Left with no choice, the Arkansas Court of Appeals opined 
that, “[s]ince there [was] no clear evidence as to the cause of death 
. . . we would have to engage in speculation and conjecture which 
is not a substitute for credible evidence, no matter how 
plausible.”13  The lack of training and care that the coroner 
wielded severely wounded this case’s trajectory and the 
possibility of fairness for Austin’s surviving spouse.14  In the end, 
his widow received no compensation from his death on the job; 
 
6. Id. 
7. Heart Attack (Myocardial Infarction), HARVARD MED. SCH. (Feb. 14, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/2DD9-LFCY]. 
8. See generally Austin, 30 Ark. App. at 62, 782 S.W.2d at 586.  
9. Id. (emphasis added). 
10. Id. at 61, 782 S.W.2d at 586 (emphasis added). 
11. Id.  It is paramount for a “medical examiner or coroner [to] use all information 
available to make a determination about the death.  This may include information from his 
or her own investigation, police reports, staff investigations, and discussions with the family 
and friends of the decedent.”  Medical Examiners’ and Coroners’ Handbook on Death 
Registration and Fetal Death Reporting, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 21 
(Apr. 2003), [https://perma.cc/8UBL-U494] (emphasis added). 
12. Austin, 30 Ark. App. at 62, 782 S.W.2d at 586. 
13. Id. at 62, 782 S.W.2d at 587. 
14. See id. 
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more importantly, however, the coroner’s lack of a proper 
investigation into Austin’s death failed her more than any court 
case could.15   
This case presents an obvious question.  How could a 
coroner—a job that has so much to do with medical 
comprehension—require so little training?16  However, the real 
question is—and should be—much broader:  how is it that 
Arkansas has allowed this severe miscarriage of justice for 
Arkansan families of the deceased?17  Because, while the lack of 
training required by coroners in Arkansas may appear like a 
minutia of an issue, the reality is far, far grimmer.18 
While it is a bleak reality, it is also an uncomplicated one—
uniquely rooted in essential quasi-property principles.19  
Although the details of what precisely a “quasi-property” right 
entails are discussed at length later, at its most basic level, two 
truths exist and must prevail for Arkansans to see any justice in 
future death investigations within the state.20  First, Arkansas 
must recognize and reconcile that it is severely underdeveloped 
and underregulated in its approach to death investigation—
specifically, Arkansas has yet to abandon the outdated coroner 
system in favor of a modern medical examiner system.21  
Secondly, Arkansas must be vigilant in treating each dead 
constituent with the utmost care and skill owed to them because 
of the quasi-property right in the dead body that “vests in the 
nearest relatives of the deceased.”22  Those two truths together 
equal one crucial takeaway:  it is a simple quasi-property right, 
vested in the decedent’s family, that requires a higher standard 
 
15. See id. 
16. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
17. The ability for a medical examiner or a coroner to provide a deceased’s family with 
a proper cause of death has an importance that should not be understated—”[t]his 
information has many uses related to the settlement of the estate and provides family 
members’ closure, peace of mind, and documentation . . . .”  Medical Examiners’ and 
Coroners’ Handbook on Death Registration and Fetal Death Reporting, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 11, at 2. 
18. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
19. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
20. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. Travelers Ins. v. Smith, 338 Ark. 81, 89, 991 S.W.2d 591, 595 (1999). 
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out of the professionals who investigate and postulate about 
deaths in the Natural State.23 
Issues abound in this sphere of policy for Arkansas; 
however, the solution is quite simple.24  Arkansas must modernize 
its regulation of the issues that truly make a difference in the lives 
and deaths of its constituents.25  Namely, Arkansas should honor 
its constituents’ postmortem quasi-property right by requiring a 
higher level of educational and experiential standards—standards 
that are achieved through abandoning the outdated coroner 
system in favor of a modern medical examiner system.26  
Hulon Rupert Austin was likely one of many Arkansans that 
died that day in March of 1986.27  However, to his family and the 
people that knew him, he was likely anything but a number.28  
While numbers are salient, numbers are also easy to glaze over.29 
For instance, in 2017, 2,813,503 people died across the United 
States.30  Of those deaths, 32,606 were Arkansans.31  In simply 
reading those numbers, it is easy to feel that glassy-eyed 
expression fog over the face.  That is an entirely natural and 
human response in feeling unable to comprehend or internalize 
such high numbers.32  “[P]sychologists who have studied 
genocides and mass disasters” noticed that “[s]omething happens 
in the brain when fatalities reach such high numbers . . . [t]he 
causalities become like a mountain of corpses that has grown so 
large it becomes difficult to focus on the individual bodies.”33  
 
23. See infra Part II. 
24. See infra Part III. 
25. See infra Part III. 
26. See infra Part III. 
27. See generally Austin v. Highway 15 Water Users Ass’n, 30 Ark. App. 60, 61, 782 
S.W.2d 585, 586 (1990). 
28. Id. 
29. See generally Jiaquan Xu et al., Mortality in the United States, 2018, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 2020), [https://perma.cc/64DZ-3UWN]. 
30. Id. 
31. Resident Deaths Due to Leading Causes, By Sex: Arkansas, 2017, ARK. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH (March 4, 2019, 10:06 AM), [https://perma.cc/YST2-C7AA]. 
32. William Wan & Brittany Shammas, Why Americans Are Numb to the Staggering 
Coronavirus Death Toll, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2020, 12:35 PM), [https://perma.cc/748T-
8BXN]. 
33. Id. 
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Perhaps “[w]ithout [the] visual, physical manifestations of deaths, 
the alarm bells in our heads fail to ring . . . .”34 
However, legislators in Arkansas have a duty not to treat 
those deaths as just simple numbers.  Instead, each death 
represents a person, a family, a lifetime, and a loss.  Legislators 
must work for the families of the deceased and bring those 
families any ounce of peace that the legislative monolith can 
bestow.  Namely, surviving family and friends of the decedent 
deserve competent coroners as the first line of peace.   
The solution to this problem is easily implementable.35  
However, it requires a fundamental belief that each death is not a 
number; each death represents a mountain of pain and sorrow for 
the affected family, friends, and loved ones.  Death is not an 
experience that Arkansas—or any state for that matter—can 
afford to treat like a statistic.  A person’s death is worth far more 
than a number.  Arkansas legislators should act like it. 
II.  TALES FROM THE CRYPT: EXHUMING THE 
HISTORY OF THE CORONER AND THE QUASI-
PROPERTY RIGHT IN DEAD BODIES 
The collision of the coroner role and the quasi-property right 
vested in dead bodies is a phenomenon that only occurred after 
centuries upon centuries of history and transformation.36  
However, each part—the coroner role and the quasi-property 
right—independently went through a sort of macabre 
metamorphosis.37  Because of that historic independence and 
modern harmony, it is necessary to dissect and appreciate each 
concept for its own importance before understanding how they 
reconcile as one cause.38  Consequently, the following literary 
journey is organized into first, setting the stage for how a quasi-
property right in dead bodies came to exist,39 and second, 
untangling the history and dissolution of the coroner role.40  
 
34. Id. 
35. See infra Part III. 
36. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
37. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
38. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
39. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
40. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
5 MOORE.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:52 PM 
582 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:3 
 
However, before either of those can occur, an understanding of 
what precisely a “quasi-property” right even means is 
imperative.41 
A. Over My Dead Body: Unraveling the Meaning  
Behind “Quasi-Property” 
Before unraveling the history of the quasi-property right in 
dead bodies, a knowledge of what a “quasi-property” right 
provides for the individual that wields it is a necessity.  
Accordingly, it is essential to begin with the most paramount 
actuality about a quasi-property right:  it truly has little to do with 
property at all—at least, not “in the ordinary sense of that 
word.”42  Rather, “[t]he concept of quasi-property [was] an 
ingenious invention by the U.S. courts to help a deserving 
plaintiff.”43  As one court brazenly asserted, this right “is 
something [that] evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and 
that it is in reality the personal feelings of the survivors which are 
being protected under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a 
lawyer.”44 
The interests that fell under this magic “quasi-property” 
umbrella were ones that “resembled property rights in their 
functioning even when they weren’t property rights, or, strictly 
speaking, ownership interests.”45  This distinction is imperative 
when understanding what exactly a quasi-property right in a body 
really even provides for the decedent’s family—this is not some 
grotesque, real ownership over a dead body.46  Instead, the 
purpose behind this right—when it is related to human 
remains47—is intrinsically linked to a court’s motivation “to 
 
41. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
42. Remigius Nnamdi Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the Challenge of Property: 
Rethinking Property Rights in Dead Bodies, Body Parts, and Traditional Knowledge 60 
(Nov. 2004) (SJD thesis, University of Toronto) (ProQuest) (emphasis added). 
43. Id.  
44. Id. at 60 n.151 (quoting State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 1986)). 
45. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, But Not Quite Property, 160 
PENN. L. REV. 1889, 1895 (2012). 
46. See id. 
47. A quasi-property right is not a right limited to the disposition of human remains; 
another example of a field of law that utilizes this terminology would be in recent trademark 
law.  Specifically, the concept of trademark dilution uses quasi-property rights for reputation.  
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protect the ‘personal feelings’ or ‘sentiment and propriety’ of the 
next of kin . . . .”48   
While this right might seem quite fluffy and difficult to pin 
down, the reality is that a quasi-property right in dead bodies is 
still somewhat inextricably linked to the general idea of 
property.49  Looking broadly at the concept of property, “[t]he 
Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual’s rights in property 
against deprivation by the state without due process.”50  An 
individual that alleges that he or she “has been deprived of a 
property right possesses a civil cause of action under section 1983 
of the Civil Rights Act.”51  Accordingly, “in order to assert a 
section 1983 claim, a party must establish two elements:  (1) that 
the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under 
color of state law; and (2) that the deprivation was of a right, 
privilege or immunity guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution.”52  However, “[t]he issue of whether an interest 
conforms to a ‘property’ right for purposes of a section 1983 suit 
is a matter of state law”—ultimately meaning that “state laws 
define the rights and obligations which guide a court’s analysis in 
determining the existence of a ‘property’ interest.”53   
While Arkansas’s adoption of the quasi-property right in 
dead bodies endures discussion later,54 the broad notion of 
statehood power in assessing property rights shines a light on the 
motivation of allotting this right in the first place—giving 
standing to deserving plaintiffs.55  Ultimately, the bottom line of 
 
Id. at 1897.  In which, “reputation is protected through a heavily circumscribed exclusionary 
framework that is tailored to the centrality of perception[.]”  Id. at 1898.  Thus, by utilizing 
a quasi-property right, this “allows trademark to retain its roots in the ideas of deceit and 
unfair competition without abandoning the idea of exclusionary protection altogether.”  Id.  
48. Balganesh, supra note 45, at 1895.  
49. See generally Michael H. Scarmon, Brotherton v. Cleveland: Property Rights in 
the Human Body—Are the Goods Oft Interred with Their Bones?, 37 S.D. L. REV. 429, 434 
(1992). 
50. Id. at 432. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 433 (emphasis added). 
54. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
55. REMIGIUS N. NWABUEZE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE CHALLENGE OF PROPERTY; 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEAD BODIES, BODY PARTS, AND GENETIC INFORMATION 60 (Sheila 
McLean, ed. 2007) [hereinafter NWABUEZE, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEAD BODIES, BODY 
PARTS, AND GENETIC INFORMATION]. 
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property comes down to only a few things:  “the rights of 
possession, exclusion, use, [] disposition, the right to enjoy fruits 
or profits, and the right of destruction.”56  In property lingo, 
scholars often refer to this as some variation of having the 
“sufficient number of [] ‘twigs’ in the property bundle . . . .”57  
However, the principal twig in that bundle for human remains is 
exclusion, and without it, deserving plaintiffs have little room for 
recourse.58  By pairing human remains recourse to the body of 
property law through the quasi-property loophole, courts have 
effectively allowed the quasi-property right “to simulate 
property’s exclusionary framework within limited settings.”59  
Those limited settings include “the plaintiff’s status in relation to 
the deceased and the nature of the defendant’s actions.”60 
Whereas ordinary property interests frequently find their 
base in tangible assets, quasi-property interests find their base in 
the relationship between the parties involved; thus, courts react 
directly “to the relationship between the parties rather than just to 
their interaction through a tangible object.”61  Coined as 
“[r]elational [i]nterests,” there are three primary triggers that 
qualify a relationship as one worth invoking a quasi-property 
right:  “[1] the status of the parties vis-à-vis each other, [2] the 
unique environment or context within which they interact, [and 3] 
the nature—wrongful or otherwise—of one party’s actions.”62  As 
for the first trigger—the status of the parties—the importance lies 
in the “settings where the law emphasizes the parties’ status [and] 
the fact that the parties’ objective/relative positions mandate that 
they pay greater attention to the manner in which they obtain and 
 
56. Patrick J. Mulqueen, “Only Dust Remains[?]”: The 9/11 Memorial Litigation and 
the Reach of Quasi-Property Rights, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 253 (2012) (quoting Erik S. 
Jaffe, Note, “She’s Got Bette Davis[‘s] Eyes”: Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of 
Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528, 549 
(1990)). 
57. Id. (quoting Melissa A.W. Stickney, Note, Property Interests in Cadaverous 
Organs: Changes to Ohio Anatomical Gift Law and the Erosion of Family Rights, 17 J.L. & 
HEALTH 37, 43 (2002)). 
58. See generally Balganesh, supra note 45, at 1892. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 1900. 
61. Id. at 1902. 
62. See generally id. at 1901-02. 
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use certain resources.”63  Similarly, for the second trigger, “the 
environment within which the parties interact over the resource is 
one that is especially sensitive and deserving of protection.”64  For 
the final, main trigger, courts actively choose “to impose liability 
on the defendant by tailoring the law’s exclusionary framework 
to the conduct that they seek to censure.”65   
With all of these triggers considered, it is clear that quasi-
property may, at times, be difficult to pin down.66  However, it is 
also a vital avenue in providing recourse for plaintiffs who have 
endured a wrong in a uniquely terrible way—through some 
violation of a deceased loved one.67  Regarded by some as a sort 
of legal magic trick, quasi-property rights should not be 
considered some work of fiction—quasi-property rights provide 
real protection to real plaintiffs.68  Ultimately, many of the 
intricate quasi-property law questions are new and unsettled; 
however, the journey quasi-property took to fruition was 
centuries in the making.69 
B. Till Death Do Us Part: The Origins of the  
Quasi-Property Right Vested in Dead Bodies 
When discussing, understanding, or arguing about any law 
or regulation, the common-sense approach often includes looking 
at the modern regulation versus its bygone counterpart.70  
However, when attempting to have those same interactions with 
the body of law that pertains to death or human remains, 
relegating or sorting laws into the past versus the present becomes 
 
63. Balganesh, supra note 45, at 1903. 
64. Id. at 1904 (emphasis added). 
65. Id. at 1905. 
66. See id. at 1906. 
67. See generally NWABUEZE, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEAD BODIES, BODY PARTS, 
AND GENETIC INFORMATION, supra note 55, at 60. 
68. See id. at 59. 
69. See Mulqueen, supra note 56, at 255. 
70. See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, The Democracy Ratchet, 94 IND. L. J. 451, 460 (2019) 
(stating that “[a]n easy benchmark . . . is to compare the new law to the old law.”); Brenda 
R. Mayrack, Note, The Implications of State ex. rel. Thomas v. Schwarz for Wisconsin 
Sentencing Policy after Truth-In-Sentencing II, WIS. L. REV. 181, 222 (2008) (comparing 
old versus new sentencing guidelines); Samuel C. Ullman, An Overview of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, 61 FLA. B. J. 13, 15-16 (1987) (comparing old versus new tax code regulations). 
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relatively impossible; notably, the label of “modern law” for the 
law regarding human remains is a bit of an oxymoron.71  
Separating the traditional history of the law regarding human 
remains from its caricatured present would strip it of all the 
significance and substance that shaped it for centuries.72  
Consequently, an understanding of the law regarding human 
remains requires an appreciation of its journey to modernity—for 
disassembling it would leave it void of the soul, theology, and 
humanity that it has attempted to pass on from generation to 
generation.73  
The inception of the legal field regarding dead bodies has a 
unique opening chapter to its story compared to many other legal 
traditions.74  Namely, “it is not principally derived from English 
common law.”75  Instead of English common law dictating the 
laws or regulations, “[f]or nearly a millennium, English law 
recognized that the Church of England had theological and 
secular jurisdiction over human remains.”76  Therefore, “[w]hile 
the common law courts had jurisdiction over property, the 
ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction concerning human remains 
. . . .”77  Consequently, those theological roots left remnants of 
tradition, value, and process that percolated through time 
throughout the United States.78 
Looking deeper and more specifically into why the English 
common law remained largely silent on human remains 
regulation, this phenomenon is likely attributable to the deafening 
voice the Bible carried into this realm of issues.79  For instance, 
the Old Testament included extensive language regarding the 
importance that the familial role played for the decedent.80  This 
 
71. See generally TANYA MARSH, THE LAW OF HUMAN REMAINS 3 (2016) 
[hereinafter MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS].  
72. See id. 
73. See id.  
74. See id. at ix. 
75. Id. 
76. MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, supra note 71, at ix. 
77. Scarmon, supra note 49, at 437. 
78. See MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, supra note 71, at 4. 
79. See id. 
80. See id.  Specifically, “[i]n Genesis, this principal is reiterated through the story of 
Abraham’s family.  After his wife Sarah died, Abraham purchased a tomb in Canaan.  When 
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concept of familial importance in the vein of dead bodies is 
evident through the English common law practice of granting “the 
heirs of the decedent . . . the right to protect the monuments, 
tombstones, and burial shrouds of the decedent [while] the 
Church took possession of the body after it was buried in the 
church grounds.”81   
That the Church of England took possession over the body 
of the deceased is an important fact to note when understanding 
that the Church owned the burial grounds in fee-simple.82  Even 
though the Church did not technically own the body itself—
instead, owning the burial ground—“the Church took 
‘possession’ of the body after burial and protected it so long as it 
remained in consecrated ground.”83  This idea that the 
“ecclesiastical courts provided a remedy against disturbers of the 
dead” became a pervasive root system for the modern professions 
tasked with death care and investigation.84 
1. A Nail in the Coffin: Modernity’s Departure from the  
Law’s Theological Inception 
To get to modern-day America’s take on a quasi-property 
right vested in dead bodies, it is important to note that early 
American settlers struggled immensely to balance theology and 
the separation of church and state.85  This careful balancing act 
compelled early American courts to “sift through the doctrines, 
principles, and values of English ecclesiastical and common law 
and determine which could be adapted for use in a country with 
greater cultural and religious diversity than England . . . .”86   
To fix that jagged notion, “[c]ourts of general jurisdiction 
replaced the delineated system that governed burials in 
 
Abraham’s grandson Jacob approached the end of his life, he instructed his sons” to bury 
him with his family in his homeland.  Id. 
81. Khushbu Solanki, Buried, Cremated, Defleshed by Buzzards? Religiously 
Motivated Excarnatory Funeral Practices Are Not Abuse of Corpse, 18 RUTGERS J. L. & 
RELIGION 350, 363 (2017). 
82. Id. 
83. MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, supra note 71, at 5 (emphasis added). 
84. Solanki, supra note 81, at 363. 
85. MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, supra note 71, at 5. 
86. Id. at 6. 
5 MOORE.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:52 PM 
588 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:3 
 
England.”87  This decision came after American courts, “[l]acking 
ecclesiastic influence and disliking the potential injustice that the 
[previous] system created,” decided to allow “a decedent’s 
relatives [to] have an interest in the body for burial and interment 
purposes.”88  However, it was not until the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Beatty v. Kurtz that the Court affirmed state 
courts’ power to create and maintain laws and regulations 
regarding human remains.89   
In the landmark decision of Beatty, the dispute itself was a 
simple land ownership disagreement.90  One party had formerly 
“platted an addition to Georgetown, indicating on the plat that a 
particular parcel was for the use of the German Lutheran 
Church.”91  However, after many years of use, the church became 
exceedingly dilapidated.92  Seeing this under-usage of the plat, the 
original owners of the land the church sat upon claimed that the 
original land grant was a “defeasible fee” and reentered the land 
“to prepare it for redevelopment.”93  In response, “[t]he Lutherans 
filed a quiet title action that ended up in the Supreme Court.”94  
This disagreement appears like a very straightforward land 
controversy.  However, there was one major issue:  the plat 
contained a cemetery, and—not only that—the original owners’ 
quest for “redevelopment” caused them to tear down 
tombstones.95  Justice Story wrote a passionate opinion against 
the original landowners and included the Court’s belief that the 
acts of the original landowners were not “mere private trespass” 
but were “a public nuisance, going to the irreparable injury of the 
 
87. Denay L. Wilding Knope, Over My Dead Body: How the Albrecht Decisions 
Complicate the Constitutional Dilemma of Due Process & the Dead, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 169, 
176 (2009). 
88. Id. 
89. See generally Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. 566 (1829); MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, 
supra note 71, at 6. 
90. Tanya D. Marsh, When Dirt and Death Collide: Legal and Property Interests in 
Burial Places, 30 PROB. & PROP. 59, 61 (2016) [hereinafter Marsh, Dirt and Death]; see also 
Beatty, 27 U.S. at 579-80. 
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Georgetown congregation of Lutherans.”96  Although this case is  
landmark in its affirmation of a state’s rights in regulating human 
remains, it is also landmark in setting a distinct tone for human 
remains law going forward—the legal protection of the 
decedent’s surviving family because of “piety or love.”97 
Since that time, laws and regulations relating to death in the 
United States have primarily been a movement regulated by state 
courts; specifically, this movement grew from a duo of court 
cases out of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania.98  From Rhode 
Island’s 1872 decision, the court held plainly “that while a dead 
body is not property in the strict sense of the common law, it is a 
quasi property, over which the relatives of the deceased have 
rights which the courts will protect.”99  Similarly, in 1904, the 
Pennsylvania decision opined that, while “there is a legally 
recognized right of custody, control, and disposition . . . it would 
be more accurate to say that the law recognizes property in a 
corpse, but property subject to a trust.”100  Thus, the age of quasi-
property law applying to corpses was born—shaping how the 
states view and handle dead bodies into the modern era.101  
Importantly, the quasi-property element inherent in a deceased 
individual’s body is a field of law that affects every single 
constituent in any state.102  However, the way that a constituent’s 
specific state dictates their laws gravely affects the quasi-property 
rights and guarantees that every individual should enjoy.103 
Importantly, the lenses of theology, history, and early 
national trends are some of the most zoomed out lenses of human 
remains law.104  Only looking through such broad lenses allows 
for the quirks and confusions that have settled amongst the fifty 
 
96. Marsh, Dirt and Death, supra note 90, at 61 (quoting Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. 566, 
584 (1829)). 
97. Id. (quoting Beatty, 27 U.S. at 585). 
98. Knope, supra note 87, at 176. 
99. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 227 (R.I. 1872); Knope, 
supra note 87, at 176. 
100. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879 (Pa. 1904) (emphasis added); Knope, supra 
note 87, at 176. 
101. See generally Knope, supra note 87, at 176. 
102. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
103. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
104. See discussion supra Sections II.A., II.B. 
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states to evade the critical eye.105  While those quirks and 
confusions may seem merely like the footnote of a trend, they 
indicate much more than that.  In the laws regulating coroners, it 
is important to remember that each of those hiccups directly 
affects every single constituent in each state—regardless of 
gender, age, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, or economic class.  
Death affects every single person.   
Without zooming in, one can miss the real injustices and 
issues faced by actual constituents, instead, just viewing them as 
mere numbers as part of a more significant trend.  For such an 
important issue that affects every person at one of the most pivotal 
and emotional points in their lives—the death of a loved one—
the states need to get it right, and the actual interests of the people 
it affects need to be at the forefront of any decision.  Each state’s 
decisions in this area of law needs tuning with the constituents in 
mind.106  Accordingly, zooming in to look at how Arkansas 
approaches quasi-property and coroner law has the important 
effect of bringing real-life problems to the forefront—hopefully 
encouraging the solving of problems and the easing of mind for 
families of the deceased.107 
2. One Foot in the Grave: Arkansas’s Take on Postmortem 
Quasi-Property Rights 
In Arkansas, the regulations surrounding and addressing 
coroners contain an inherent duality:  the severe under regulation 
of coroners against the backdrop of a seemingly generous quasi-
property right in dead bodies.108  The 1999 decision by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court in Travelers Insurance Company v. 
Smith is a landmark decision for Arkansans’ quasi-property right 
in the bodies of their deceased loved ones.109  For the first time, 
Arkansas officially recognized that there exists “[a] quasi-
 
105. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
106. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
107. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
108. See infra notes 187-196 and accompanying text; Travelers Ins. v. Smith, 338 Ark. 
81, 89, 991 S.W.2d 591, 595 (1999). 
109. 338 Ark. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595. 
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property right in dead bodies [that] vests in the nearest relatives 
of the deceased, arising out of their duty to bury their dead.”110   
This important property right becomes increasingly notable 
when considering professions that deal directly with the families 
of deceased individuals—namely because that very same case 
held that an insurance company acts as an agent for said family 
members.111  The court stated that “it should have been clear . . . 
that [the insurance company’s] action or inaction would impact 
the family.”112  Therefore, when a family trusts an insurance 
company with making major decisions in the care of a deceased 
individual, that insurance company has a particular duty to act in 
accordance with that family’s wishes.113  Specifically, because an 
agent of another party must “act on the principal’s behalf and be 
subject to the principal’s control,” they are bound by the 
principal’s wishes—here, that principal being the nearest relatives 
of the deceased.114   
Additionally, the Travelers Insurance Company decision 
reiterates that “one who intentionally, recklessly, or negligently 
withholds the body of a dead person or prevents its proper 
interment or cremation is subject to liability of the family of the 
deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body.”115  
Therefore, by these stated standards, Arkansas appears to hold 
insurance companies to a high degree of ethical requirements 
regarding the decision-making in the treatment and care of the 
deceased.116  Specifically, in Travelers Insurance Company, the 
family of the deceased endured a five-day delay in the embalming 
process of its family member.117  Due to this “delay in the 
embalming process and the deterioration of the body, the body 
was not deemed presentable for an open casket funeral.”118  If that 
 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 93-94, 991 S.W.2d at 598. 
112. Id. at 94, 991 S.W.2d at 598-99.  
113. See Holly v. State, 2017 Ark. 201, at 22, 520 S.W.3d 677, 691 (stating “that the 
two essential elements of an agency relationship are (1) that an agent have the authority to 
act for the principal and (2) that the agent act on the principal’s behalf and be subject to the 
principal’s control.”). 
114. Id. 
115. Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 90, 991 S.W.2d at 596.  
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 87, 991 S.W.2d at 594. 
118. Id. 
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alone had not been enough of a slap in the face to the family, the 
funeral home also attempted to charge it for the refrigeration 
required in “keeping the body for five additional days prior to 
embalming.”119  In the end, the court affirmed the jury’s verdict 
of $60,000.00 in damages ($20,000.00 for each of the 
plaintiffs).120   
While the case of that family pertains specifically to 
insurance companies,121 coroners are not and should not be off the 
hook from these standards of duty in Arkansas.  Although the 
duties owed by a coroner are far more abstract,122 the recognition 
of their existence is imperative—in fact, “[t]he first attempt to 
bring a constitutional challenge regarding” the quasi-property 
right in a dead body versus a coroner was a case out of Arkansas:  
Fuller v. Marx.123  Although the plaintiff initially lost this case in 
the district court, the Eighth Circuit noted that the loss pertained 
to a previous belief in Arkansas that a quasi-property right in a 
dead body bestowed upon the family of the deceased did not 
exist.124  Clearly, fifteen years later, the tide has continued its shift 
with Travelers Insurance Company.125  Accordingly, a shift of the 
tide in a duty owed by coroners to the families of the deceased 
should follow suit.   
A notion of similar regard found consideration in Waeschle 
v. Dragovic—a 2008 case out of Michigan.126  In that case, the 
court found that the plaintiff had a “constitutional right to notice 
that she did not receive [decedent]’s brain” after the coroner never 
notified her of such alterations.127  The court came to this 
conclusion through the belief that “next-of-kin have a cognizable 
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for violation of the right 
to a deceased relative’s body.”128  This chain of thinking is nearly 
 
119. Id. 
120. Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 87, 991 S.W.2d at 594. 
121. Id. at 90, 991 S.W.2d at 596. 
122. See infra Section II.C. 
123. 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984); Knope, supra note 87, at 190. 
124. Fuller, 724 F.2d at 719; Knope, supra note 87, at 190. 
125. See Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595.  
126. Knope, supra note 87, at 199.  
127. Id. at 200 (quoting Waeschle v. Dragovic, No. 08-10393, 2008 WL 4372636, at 
*7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2008)). 
128. Id. 
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a mirror image of the decision of the court in Travelers Insurance 
Company—holding that—due to the insurance company’s poor 
choices—“it should have been clear . . . that [the insurance 
company’s] actions or inaction would impact the family” and 
violate the key duty between the parties.129   
Although there is currently no black and white obligation by 
coroners owed to families in Arkansas, a conclusion of such 
magnitude is not beyond the scope of feasibility for the existing 
case precedent.130  Instead, a conclusion that coroners do owe 
some duty of care and skill to the families would serve as a natural 
conclusion for the direction in which the court in Travelers 
Insurance Company already set its sights.131  While this likely 
might be a controversial claim to some, requiring a duty out of 
coroners can only serve Arkansans with more respect and 
dignity—which they deserve during a time already filled with 
intense grief.  
The Travelers Insurance Company case perfectly 
encapsulates a clear moral compass for the State of Arkansas in 
the area of coroner regulation.132  However, in referencing later 
discussion, the peculiarly low standards that the State then turns 
around and holds its coroners to are embarrassingly low and void 
of said moral compass.133  Because of that disconnect, the cases 
that deal with coroners appear as residual damage control for what 
could simply be commonly cured by higher standards and 
education.134  Due to those lax regulations on the actual people 
that carry out these human remains laws that the State purportedly 
holds in such high regard, it is easy to conclude that said lax 
regulations inherently violate the State’s moral compass.135  
However, those issues endure discussion at length later.136  For 
 
129. Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 94, 991 S.W.2d at 598-99. 
130. See generally id. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595 (stating that “[a] quasi-property right 
in dead bodies vests in the nearest relatives of the deceased . . . .”); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 
717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that the plaintiff lost under old rule in which there was a 
lack of property rights vested in a dead body’s organs). 
131. See generally Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595. 
132. See generally id. at 92-93, 991 S.W.2d at 597-98. 
133. See infra Section II.C. 
134. See infra Section II.C. 
135. See infra Section II.C. 
136. See infra Section II.C. 
5 MOORE.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:52 PM 
594 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:3 
 
now, it is essential to recognize the lack of clarity at which 
Arkansas’s laws—on a surface level—care for the rights and 
respect of the bodies of the deceased.137  This clarity is important 
because it will serve as a backdrop for the lack of care and respect 
lazily required from the coroners that actually investigate the 
deceased individuals.138 
C. As Long as We Both Shall Live: The Origin  
and Dissolution of the Coroner Role in  
Favor of the Medical Examiner 
The history behind the coroner’s role is an important 
consideration as part of this conversation.  In its humble 
beginnings, the position of coroner was one that the United States 
took from England’s tradition, “just as they took over the sheriff 
and the jury system.”139  Originally called “crowners,” these 
bygone coroners “were knights appointed by the king of England 
to investigate deaths in which the crown had a property 
interest.”140  Thus, from the very beginning of the coroner story, 
the idea of property and death investigation intermingled.141  
Using property as their motivation in investigating an 
unexplained death, “crowners used crude medical and legal 
knowledge to make fact based determinations regarding 
questioned deaths, [and] were, in a sense, death investigation 
experts.”142 
As this original “crowner” system began to dissipate, 
England replaced it with what modern America would recognize 
as a coroner.143  While death investigation remained the 
cornerstone of the coroner’s role in the post-”crowner” age, a 
significant difference existed between the two times:  how the 
 
137. See infra Section II.C. 
138. See infra Section II.C. 
139. Lawrence M. Friedman & Paul W. Davies, California Death Trip, 36 IND. L. REV. 
17, 18 (2003).  
140. Robert D. Felder, A Coroner System in Crisis: The Scandals and Struggles 
Plaguing Louisiana Death Investigation, 69 LA. L. REV. 627, 631-32 (2009) (emphasis 
added).  
141. See generally id. at 632. 
142. Id. (emphasis added). 
143. Id. 
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community chose the coroner.144  For crowners, a king appointed 
them; for the new coroner system, a community elected them.145  
By electing this new age of death investigators, novel problems 
presented themselves for the crown that the coroners served and 
the people that the coroners investigated.146 
One of these paramount, new problems occurred due to the 
shifting motivations that the new age of coroners wrought.147  
Namely, the appointment of crowners by a king, due to their skill 
and ability in performing investigations, was starkly different 
compared to the new election system of coroners—in which, “the 
knights who specialized in death investigation were replaced by 
powerful political figures with little to no expertise in the 
field.”148  Additionally, a similar problem unfolded regarding 
power imbalances.149  This problem occurred “[b]ecause 
[coroners] wielded the power to seize property from citizens, 
[and] many coroners began using their power for self-serving 
interests.”150  Ultimately, “[i]t was this [election] system, one 
based on political interests in property rather than science, which 
crossed the Atlantic Ocean and thereafter influenced death 
investigations in the American colonies.”151   
Through that original metamorphosis, the modern American 
coroner was born; however, to many Americans, the actual duties 
that belong to a coroner may be somewhat of a mystery.152  After 
all, “[i]n today’s world of highly glamorized forensic science 
 
144. Id. at 632-33. 
145. Felder, supra note 140, at 631-32. 




150. Felder, supra note 140, at 632. 
151. Id. 
152. Out of all the duties and responsibilities that fall under the coroner role, there is a 
glaring quirk that seems fitting for the likes of a Wild West film—in Arkansas, the coroner 
is responsible for the arrest of a sheriff.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-41-511 (1947).  While it 
seems like this should be an archaic and untouched protocol, this duty came to pass as 
recently as 2016.  Tom Sissom, Arkansas Law Gives Coroners Authority Over Jails, ARK. 
DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Jan. 20, 2016, 1:17 AM), [https://perma.cc/4UCS-3M2P].  In 
response to the 2016 arrest of Benton County Sheriff Kelly Cradduck, the Benton County 
coroner was summoned by local prosecutors to dust off this odd protocol.  Id.  This legislative 
oddity is further proof that the Arkansas legislature should revitalize this bygone system.  
See discussion infra Part III. 
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dramas . . . the public has developed grave misconceptions about 
what realistically can be accomplished and what is statutorily 
required in the performance of a forensic death investigation.”153  
Therefore, to sober any preconceived notions regarding what a 
coroner does, it is important to look directly at the source:  state 
law—specifically, under Arkansas state law, the powers and 
duties of a coroner include that, after a death is reported, “he or 
she shall conduct an investigation concerning the circumstances 
surrounding the death of an individual and gather and review 
background information, including, but not limited to, medical 
information and any other information which may be helpful in 
determining the cause and manner of death.”154  This job 
description might be shocking to some due to a key lacking 
attribute that is commonly—and incorrectly—attributed to 
coroners:  conducting autopsies.155  Without it, the Arkansas 
statute could simply be describing Nancy Drew in any of her 
famous adventures.156   
Although those in the coroner role do not conduct the actual 
autopsy itself, they have a crucial role in tipping off whether there 
is a need for an autopsy or death investigation at all.157  For 
instance, coroners are the first line of defense in noticing 
indicators of toxicology concerns for the deceased; therefore, 
“[w]hen the proper and uniform technique and procedure [is] 
invoked in the collection, testing, and custody of toxicologic 
specimens, the conclusions of a death investigator’s autopsy 
report can have great scientific weight in a court of law.”158  On 
the opposite side of the coin, “individuals without a medical 
background may be more likely to miss subtle signs and fail to 
order toxicological testing.”159  Consequently, once “signs are 
 
153. Felder, supra note 140, at 627. 
154. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-15-301 (1993). 
155. § 14-15-301. 
156. §  14-15-301; Nancy Drew Series, PENGUIN RANDOM HOUSE, [https://perma.cc/EA32-
F887]. 
157. Andrea R. Tischler, Speaking for the Dead: A Call for Nationwide Coroner 
Reform, 33 SW.  U. L. REV. 553, 559 (2004). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
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missed and tests are not done properly in the beginning” of an 
investigation, “the mistake will generally never be detected.”160   
The former chief medical examiner in Virginia, Marcella 
Fierro, opined that an “autopsy is the cornerstone of death 
investigation”; therefore, if a coroner believes “a death isn’t 
recognized as being suspicious . . . [then] it’s buried or cremated, 
whatever the family wishes, never to rise again.”161  Most 
ominously, she stated that “[m]ost errors are buried.”162  
Ultimately, the panel, in which Marcella Fierro herself sat, stated 
that “coroners [are] the weak[est] link.”163  Simply put, “on their 
best day, if [coroners] do not have the training, the skills, the 
infrastructure, the facility, [and] the access to forensic science, 
they can’t do a good job.”164 
Toxicology is just one example of these grave dangers that 
states face when deciding on the education and training required 
for their coroners.165  An even more sour reality unveils itself in 
the courtroom; in which, some courts have held that coroners’ 
testimony is completely inadmissible or only admissible if they 
“possess[] the necessary experiential qualifications.”166  The fact 
that some coroners would not even be able to have those 
experiential qualifications should be disheartening to the 
constituents for which those coroners serve.167  Because of the 
gravity of such an important role, it should not be a partisan or 
difficult choice to make when requiring more out of some of the 
state’s most important investigators.  However, the current 
landscape of what states require out of this class of individuals 
tells an increasingly different story.168  
While the coroner’s position is one of longstanding heritage, 
the coroner position has also stood the test of time in many states; 
 
160. Id. at 559–60. 
161. Sandra Bartlett, Coroners Don’t Need Degrees to Determine Death, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Feb. 2, 2011, 12:06 PM), [https://perma.cc/B8NJ-A5UB]. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. (emphasis added). 
164. Id. (emphasis added). 
165. Tischler, supra note 157, at 559. 
166. Id. at 561. 
167. See infra text accompanying notes 187–97.  
168. See infra notes 169-88 and accompanying text. 
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however, many states changed or eliminated the role entirely.169  
For instance, “Massachusetts abolished the position in 1877, and 
created the post of ‘medical examiner’”—a position requiring a 
medical degree.170  Importantly, in addition to having some sort 
of medical certification or degree, the term “medical examiner” 
also generally denotes that the position is appointed—not 
elected.171  
In 1915, New York and Rhode Island followed 
Massachusetts and took similar steps.172  Starting then and 
moving into the 1990s, the states unleashed a domino effect in 
which “most states had either gotten rid of the coroner altogether, 
and replaced this office with a medical examiner, or with a mixed 
system of some sort—both a medical examiner and a coroner; or 
a system in which some counties had coroners, and others had 
medical examiners.”173  Because of this hybrid system, the 
educational standards required for either coroners or medical 
examiners fell into a sort of disarray.174 
In response to this confusion, a “panel [was] created by the 
National Academy of Sciences” that worked to “point[] out the 
lack of mandatory standards for autopsies and the absence of 
oversight into the performance of coroners and medical 
examiners.”175  After this effort by the panel, it opined that “the 
goal of every state should be to move away from a coroner 
system, which is not based on medicine, and instead hire board 
certified forensic pathologists and put them to work as medical 
examiners.”176  With all of these varying answers to the future of 
the coroner tradition, it is natural that the degree of education 
required for these important officials is the key issue that is under 
fire on a national scale.177 
 
169. Friedman & Davies, supra note 139, at 18. 
170. Id. 
171. Carl Parrott, Comparing Medical Examiner and Coroner Systems: Advantages 
and Disadvantages of the Coroner System, INST. OF MED. (US) COMM. FOR THE WORKSHOP 
ON THE MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION (2003), [https://perma.cc/YUR8-PF79]. 
172. Friedman & Davies, supra note 139, at 18. 
173. Id.; see also Bartlett, supra note 161. 
174. See Bartlett, supra note 161. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. (emphasis added).  
177. See id. 
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The hardest pill to swallow for this education conundrum is 
that, nationally, “most coroners are laypersons elected for 
specified terms, and few have had any formal medical or legal 
training.”178  For a profession tasked with such an integral part of 
the death investigation process, “[p]ersons who have held the 
position of coroner include sheriff’s deputies, school bus drivers, 
tow truck operators, gas station attendants, tavern owners, 
accountants, and even jewelry salesmen.”179  This is not to say 
that perhaps these individuals were not well-intentioned members 
of their local communities hoping to serve the best they could in 
that role; however, it needs mentioning that jobs with such a high 
degree of importance and opportunity to cause irreparable harm 
to a family or an investigation should require an equally pressing 
degree of specialized knowledge and training.   
While it is true that “[i]n most states, elected coroners are 
not required to be physicians or forensic pathologists,” there are 
many other states that provide extensive qualifications or 
trainings required to fill these posts.180  Naturally, some states, 
including Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Ohio, require that 
coroners be physicians.181  While that high requirement is a rarity 
in the national trend, the other conditions across many of the 
states are still quite weighty.182   
For instance, in West Virginia, “[a] county medical examiner 
shall be medically trained and licensed by the state of West 
Virginia as a physician, registered nurse, paramedic, emergency 
medical technician or a physician assistant, [and] be certified in 
the practice of medicolegal death investigation.”183  In Alabama, 
a person cannot qualify to serve as a coroner “[u]nless he or she 
[h]as at least 24 months of previous service as a county coroner 
or deputy coroner in the state.”184  Similarly, in Texas, “[t]o the 
greatest extent possible, the medical examiner shall be appointed 
from persons having training and experience in pathology, 
 
178. Tischler, supra note 157, at 559. 
179. Id. 
180. Coroner Training Requirements, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Jan. 15, 2015), [https://perma.cc/4KJ9-ELEQ]. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. (emphasis added). 
184. Id. 
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toxicology, histology, and other medico-legal sciences.”185  West 
Virginia, Alabama, and Texas serve as examples of only sixteen 
states with laws on the books requiring any level of education for 
this crucial investigatory role186—a horrifying figure that needs 
substantial upheaval on a national scale.  
However, focusing in on Arkansas, each of its seventy-five 
counties have their own coroners, with seventy-three of those 
counties electing those positions.187  The qualifications for 
serving as coroner:  being eighteen years of age and not being a 
felon.188  If those factors were not jarring enough, the training 
after being elected to the job is even bleaker.189  While Arkansas 
“offered free death investigation training” for coroners starting in 
2015, only twenty counties completed it as of 2016.190  As one 
coroner from Van Buren County crassly put it, “[y]ou’re not 
going to get no cooperation to take off from your full-time job to 
go do something that’s kind of free and not required.”191   
The picture for coroners got slightly sweeter in 2019 when 
the Arkansas General Assembly passed a law that “requir[ed] the 
certification [of] deputy coroners.”192  The training in question:  a 
minuscule certification course.193  Specifically, under Arkansas 
law, coroners and deputy coroners have to complete a training 
“that consists of no less than sixteen (16) hours [and no] more 
than forty (40) hours of instruction.”194  For a quick reference, 
“[m]edical school takes 4 years to complete, but to become a 
doctor [students] also spend 3-7 years in residency.”195  In 
contrast, the course that Arkansas requires “includes basics about 
death investigation, state laws and statutes, crime scene 
 
185. Coroner Training Requirements, supra note 180. 
186. Id. 
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investigations and how to make proper death notifications 
. . . .”196   
Due to the inherent and paramount importance of a death 
investigator like a coroner or a medical examiner, Arkansans 
clearly deserve more than hardly trained professionals.  The 
quasi-property right endowed to constituents who are close 
relatives of the deceased should provide a concrete duty for 
coroners to act with a certain level of respect and skill on behalf 
of those families.197  A decision that coroners owe some duty of 
care and skill to the families of the deceased should act as a 
natural conclusion for the direction that the court in Travelers 
Insurance Company already chose.198  It is time for Arkansas to 
protect its constituents from lazy legislation and regulation over 
some of the state’s most important investigators. 
III.  KICKING THE BUCKET: THE SOLUTION TO 
ARKANSAS’S GRAVE MISTAKE 
The solution to Arkansas’s broken system is not a difficult 
one, but it is a grave one.  In their current state, Arkansas’s 
coroner regulations fail their constituents at almost every step of 
the way.199  From the moment a person dies, the local coroner’s 
office likely lacks the breadth of training necessary to deliver a 
quality report on the cause of death.200  Even worse, the office 
may not have enough education to recognize the need for a further 
autopsy request.201  These each seem like significant issues, and 
they are.  However, their gravity does not require an equally grave 
realm of regulation.  Simple regulations can make a world of 
difference for future generations of constituents who pass away.  
Stated plainly, Arkansas’s current coroner system does not 
provide the necessary experiential or educational components 
imperative for death investigators to properly postulate about the 
causes of death within the state.202  Accordingly, under the current 
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regime, Arkansas coroners inherently fail the duty of care and 
skill arguably owed to families of the deceased under the 
precedent set in Travelers Insurance Company.203  There is a clear 
solution to this failure:  switching to a medical examiner system 
that requires the appointment of a physician. 
The medical examiner system was recommended by the 
panel created by the National Academy of Sciences in 2009,204 
and there are currently “16 states and the District of Columbia” 
that abide by that system—of which “[m]edical examiners are 
appointed to their position and [are] almost always . . . 
physicians.”205  By eliminating the coroner system, requiring the 
appointment—not election—of medical examiners, and 
mandating that the position be for physicians only, the state would 
greatly benefit its constituents by providing adequate 
investigations into their deaths by specialized health 
professionals.206  
It may seem easy to dismiss this idea due to a possible 
misconception that Arkansas’s lower population density provides 
for a lower need for investigations into suspicious deaths.207  
However, that assumption could not be further from the truth for 
the Natural State.  In reality, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (“CDC”) ranked Arkansas ninth out of all the states in 
homicide mortality.208  Additionally, in 2017, Arkansas held 
almost double the national average rate for firearm deaths—
sitting at 20.3 while the national rate sits at 12.0.209  Finally, if 
those statistics were not jarring enough, in 2017, Arkansas ranked 
ninth in the United States for suicide deaths—deaths that often 
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require investigation for cause or suspicion.210  Most recently, in 
2020, USA Today ranked Arkansas as the fourth most dangerous 
state in the country.211  These statistics prove one central point:  
Arkansas cannot consider itself a state exempt from requiring 
extensive medical knowledge and training for some of its most 
critical investigative workers due to any fantasy that it is 
somehow a state that experiences low rates of suspicious 
deaths.212   
In contrast, an apt critique in moving towards a medical-
examiner-only approach would come from the fact that Arkansas 
ranks thirty-third in active physicians within the state.213  
However, this is an exceedingly easy argument to overcome 
based on the reality that Arkansas—utterly separate from the 
medical examiner question—needs the generation of more 
physician interest in the state regarding regular healthcare for its 
constituents.214  Although the University of Arkansas Medical 
School (“UAMS”) “is among the top 10 programs in the country 
in graduating primary care specialists,” the issue is that “[b]y 
2030, [the state will] need almost 500 additional . . . physicians 
just to meet the needs of the state, and [the state is] just not 
graduating enough to meet that need . . . .”215  Therefore, having 
more doctors in the state is not a need for just a single issue; it is 
a crucial need for various issues that constituents will face in the 
near future.  It is in the legislature’s best interest for those it serves 
to generate more appeal in—not only being a doctor—but being 
a doctor in Arkansas.   
To solve this important issue regarding physicians—
specifically for medical examiner positions—funding will likely 
play an important role in generating that interest.216  While 
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funding is a challenging and grid-locking question for every state 
legislature, it is time for Arkansas to put its money where its 
mouth is:  purportedly caring about deceased Arkansans and the 
families they leave behind.  Arkansas must ditch the coroner 
system in favor of a modernized medical examiner position—
therefore finally equipping this crucial role to fulfill an arguable 
duty of care and skill to the families of the deceased.217 
IV.  BITE THE DUST: A CONCLUSION 
Throughout all of this history, law, and transformation, one 
takeaway is blatantly apparent:  Arkansas fails to fulfill the quasi-
property right in dead bodies—affirmed and afforded to 
Arkansans in Travelers Insurance Company—and favors ill-
trained and ill-equipped individuals as the leaders of death 
investigations within the state.218  This failure has percolated 
throughout centuries of history and transformation that has left 
the current coroner role in the shell of a position that it is now:  
unable to fulfill a dire and important need in owing some duty of 
skill or care to families throughout the death investigation 
process.219   
There is no question that there is no clear duty by coroners 
owed to families in Arkansas; however, a conclusion that 
coroners do owe some duty is an obvious and natural conclusion 
for the direction that the court already laid out in Travelers 
Insurance Company.220  By continuing the bygone system of 
electing coroners who often fail to possess the skills or education 
that would be proper for a job of such scientific magnitude, 
Arkansas is allowing death investigations to take a backseat to 
political showmanship.221 
Arkansas can no longer hide behind laws that do little in 
protecting families who are inevitably in some of the worst days 
they will experience in life.222  The quasi-property right inherent 
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in a dead body vested in the nearest family of the deceased must 
be honored.223  Without it, families will continue to suffer at the 
hands of those that lack proper education—failing in the endeavor 
of properly serving constituents, properly investigating deaths, 
and properly providing peace of mind for families throughout that 
process.224  Accordingly, Arkansas must ditch the coroner system 
in favor of a modernized medical examiner role.225  The 
legislature cannot afford to treat each Arkansans’ death as a 
number—each number represents a lifetime.  Arkansas should not 
say “till death do us part” with its current regulations—Arkansans 
are more than a number.  The legislature should act like it.  
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